William Hasker’s philosophy of mind: the case for interactionist dualism

Dmytro Sepety

Abstract


The author considers William Hasker’s dualistic mind-body conception, and outlines its place in the context of the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. He also explains main Hasker’s arguments against eliminativism and other versions of materialism, in favor of the view that mind is nonphysical and determines human behavior by a causal influence to the physical processes in the brain.


Keywords


Consciousness; brain; materialism; dualism; physical; subjectivity; epiphenomenalism; intercessionism; rationality

References


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