Two approaches to modification of object-property relation in meinongianism

Anastasiya Kovalenko


The paper considers two approaches to a modification of an object–property relation in meinongianism. These approaches are developed to solve some paradoxes emerged due to including intentional objects into the range of interpretation of the propositional attitudes. The author demonstrates the limits of these approaches in resolving the paradoxes, and compares them to each other.


meinongianism; principle of unrestricted free assumption; intentional objects; property; predicate


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