Do «quantum zombies» threaten interactionist dualism?

Dmytro Sepetyi

Abstract


The author considers a possibility of eliminating the facts about experience with retaining a consistent causal story. He proposes an explanation of how an interactionist can solve this problem. The point is made that such a solution should be based on an individualistic-holistic view of mind as an entity that is ontologically indivisible and, at the same time, very complex with respect to the richness of mental  properties and possibilities of development, so that no physical model can adequately represent them.


Keywords


mental; physical; dualism; interactionism; experience

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