Actual Problems of Mind

Rawls' Theory of International Justice: A Brief Reconstruction and Critical Commentary

Charilaos Stampoulis — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

Mind Engineering, Habit, and Human Nature

Andrii Leonov — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

This paper attempts to do the following things. First, it reinterprets the notion of “mind engineering” from a more neutral standpoint and offers a totally new approach to the phenomenon. Thus, instead of looking at the phenomenon from a wholly negative perspective (such as identification of mind engineering with “brainwashing,” “mind control” and other manipulatory techniques), it defines mind engineering as the process of “design/redesign, implementation/reimplementation, evaluation/reevaluation of minds.” In itself, this process can be deliberate or forceful. Here, the author looks at deliberate mind engineering primarily.

Secondly, the “mind” is defined as a set of beliefs, and the latter, following Charles Peirce, is interpreted as the set of habits. The phenomenon of habit is interpreted pragmatically-hermeneutically and is defined as a “‘fixed’ functional interpretation of the world and one’s place in it that either works or does not work.” If a specific interpretation constantly works, it constitutes a “good” habit. If it does not work, it means a “bad” habit. Unlike the current social-psychological approaches to habit as goal-independent and automatic, and therefore “mindless”/non-cognitive, the author claims that habits are essentially goal-dependent, and cognitive. The habit’s main goal is to resolve the problematic situation that the organism is in. Habit’s cognitive element is grounded in the organism’s interpretive effort that allows it to specify a problematic situation as problematic. Therefore, the connection between the organism and a situation is not direct/immediate but rather is mediated via functional interpretive meaning. In the end, mind engineering must be taken as “habit engineering,” and, thus understood, the phenomenon in question can be seen as one of the key phenomena to clarify human nature.

Analytic philosophy of history of Arthur Danto: paradoxes of historical knowledge

Olena Mishalova — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Abstract: The paper claims that Arthur Danto's conception of analytic philosophy oh history is the first systematic attempt of analytic analyzing the historical knowledge, its limits and possibilities of knowing the past. The author emphasizes that Danto presents a post-positivist approach to solving epistemological issues of history, so his philosophy oh history might be considered as the result of a successful rethinking of a narrow positivist approach to science.

In Analytical Philosophy of History Danto clearly divides the philosophy of history into the substantive philosophy of history, aimed at describing “all history”: all past and all future, and analytic philosophy of history, which is aimed at investigating issues of historical knowing. Conceptions of substantive philosophy of history assert of being theories of history, they often use historical research texts as simply factual material foe their speculative constructions. Substantive philosophy of history is deeply criticized by Danto as a mistaken mode of thinking about the past that unjustified extrapolates the narrative structures of historical narrative into the future and predicts (and narrates) events before they happen. A historian can make predictions about certain events in the past and discover them as a result if his or her predictions were correct, but history deals only with the past.

It is stressed that Danto distinguishes and analyzes a number of “paradoxes” of historical knowledge, caused both by historians' lack of knowledge of the trends in the development of modern science, and by the lack of understanding of the real problems of historical knowing in the contemporary philosophy of science. For example, this applies to the issue of unobservability of subject-matter, which is more the rule than the exception for modern sciences, therefore it cannot pose any exceptional epistemological problems for history. This also applies to the issue of theoretical and value loading of historical knowledge. Danto calls it the Bacon's mistake to believe that a scientist or historian starts their research with the study of “pure” facts, they both need theoretical training to begin their investigation at all. History as a science is characterized by that feature, according to which a historian, as Danto soundly proves, often knows more and better about the events he or she studies than the participants or witnesses of these events.

Tolerance and criticality: intolerance to falsehood

Nadiia Kozachenko — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Tolerance has limits. Tolerance is an attitude that recognizes the other as equal but different. If we cannot distinguish between false and different, we may end up with counterfeit tolerance. In order to make such a distinction, we have to accompany tolerance with critical evaluation. If the conditions for the functioning of tolerance are violated and the corresponding attitude toward social practices continues to be called tolerance, we can obtain an unlimited tolerance that applies to everything. This kind of pseudo-tolerance is based on indifference or incompetence, but not on critical evaluation. There is also a forced tolerance for which there is no reason other than some kind of coercion. Neither is tolerance, even though they are called by the same term and can be applied in similar situations.

Tolerance supports the norm. Tolerance as a social phenomenon has an unobvious consequence - it changes the status of the tolerated phenomenon by bringing it to the level of social acceptance and later approval. Tolerance sanctions the tolerated phenomenon as a permissible other that cannot be criticized and can be accepted. With pseudo-tolerance, there is a danger that some phenomena will be accepted as socially acceptable for no reason. However, such phenomena directly destroy the environment of tolerance. For example: justifiable violence or harmless lies.

Not everything is tolerable. There are certain social practices that cannot be tolerated because they are not other but wrong or dangerous. The question of the possibility of tolerating social practices requires the use of critical thinking to find and apply appropriate criteria. Fake, lies, and misinformation cannot be tolerated because they destroy the conditions of tolerance in the epistemic community. They create irremovable epistemic alternatives that diminish the cognitive status of knowledge in general, thereby causing the degradation of the epistemic environment. To preserve the opportunity to be tolerant, we must worry about how we can maintain an environment in which we can be tolerant. Likewise, to be able to acquire knowledge, we must care for the epistemic environment in which we can do so productively.

On the problem of forming a theoretical and methodological platform of environmental education

Halyna Baluta — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Іn the XXI century, more attention is drawn to the development of ecological thinking. Instead of explicating treatment of nature, a human being should take care of it. Such a caring attitude should become an educational universal, so it is to be transmitted as value. Ecological culture is analyzed as ethics of conservation аnd hermeneutic practice. However, the ecological-discursive paradigm is still problematic in education. A serious drawback of education is the fragmentation of knowledge, the lack of a methodological platform that provides a picture of the unity of the world, the "family kinship" of its phenomena. Reproduction of the general picture is a possible way of introducing ethical "understanding" discourse into the cognitive horizon. Therefore, the objective of the paper is to analyze it as a complex approach in philosophy of education. The paper considers environmental anthropology as the methodological basis of the ecological-discursive paradigm, and also a theoretician-methodological platform of environmental education: а) the concept of the value of life and its continuation in all manifestations and forms (A. Schweitzer), b) holistic worldview, с) communicative ethics, integral methodological pluralism as different ways of interpreting the essence (К. Wilber) d) new models of cognition. The paper emphasizes that ecological thinking cannot be developed without changing an epistemological model. Thus, instead of facts and competences, the person’s cognition should be based on values. The paper highlights the idea of diagnostic cognition, which is based on values. Therefore, the metaphysical picture of the world has a significant theoretical and methodological potential, which unfolds in the cognitive and ethical horizon and is a practice of educational reflection that integrates different types of rationality, interprets the process of modernization in education as the rehabilitation of ontological values displaced by the instrumental values of technological progress.

On some argumentative modifications in logic

Volodymyr Navrotskyi — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Abstract. The reorientation of logical research from the analysis of individual sentences to the analysis of argument systems leads to some changes in logic itself. Such a reorientation is due to the features of plausible arguments put forward to support decision-making. One such feature is that applying the rules of inference does not guarantee that the conclusion of a plausible argument is justified. It is necessary to explain how exactly the transition from the premises to the conclusion of such an argument takes place. It must be established that the transmission of the justification from the premises to the conclusion with the help of the rules of inference really took place. It depends on this whether the individual is committed to accepting the conclusion and applying it in his further reasoning.

The basis for accepting the conclusion of a plausible argument as justified is a successful defense against counterargument attacks. The introduction of the means of presentation of the competition of arguments into the logic is one of the features of its communicative transformation.

The conclusions of plausible arguments are justified only to a certain extent. It is recommended not to strive for full justification of conclusions, but to establish only the degree of their justification, precisely because of the incompleteness of information, presented in the premises of such arguments.

In the semantics used to justify the conclusions of plausible arguments, the premises and rules of inference are assigned degrees of conviction. They reflect the strength of these structural components of arguments. And the justification of the conclusion of the argument is calculated on the basis of assigning degrees of conviction to its components and components of its counterarguments.

Argumentation depends on values, so the database used to build arguments must also contain information about them. Just like beliefs, values can also have degrees. Semantic rules for calculating the degree of justification of conclusions should take these degrees into account. Logical semantics, modified in this way, appears to be the most suitable tool for evaluating practical plausible arguments, and in particular for answering critical questions raised about such arguments.

Identіty іn analytіc phіlosophy, socіology, and psychology: sіmіlarіty and dіfference

Olena Olifer — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Abstract. In the twenty-first century, scholars pay considerable attention to the question of the identity of a person. This category is studied in philosophy, humanities, and social studies. However, there is a question of similarity and differences in the understanding of the term “identity”. Is identity viewed the same in philosophy, sociology, and psychology? The paper attempts to compare the understanding of identity as a category in the mentioned fields of study.

First, the article outlines the historical development of identity, sociology, and psychology and the understanding of this category. In analytic philosophy, identity is the question of a person's existence over time: whether the person at time t₁ is identical to a person at time t₂. In psychology, identity is regarded as the feeling of being an unchanged subject of thoughts in the stream of consciousness and as the identification with social roles. The first understanding is personal identity. It is viewed the same as in philosophy. The other is social identity. Sociology considers identity predominantly as social identity.

Then, the paper compares the understanding of identity in analytic philosophy, psychology, and sociology. In analytic philosophy, personal identity is viewed as logical construction, but the notion of personal identity in psychology is based on the Pure Ego theory. It means identity is a minimal unit and cannot be analyzed further. Social identity is regarded as logical construction. Personal identity in analytic philosophy and social identity in psychology and sociology are based on the same methodological approach, so the paper compares these two categories. As a result of the comparison, some differences have been found in the understanding of the ontological status of the category “identity” and its practical realization.

Information warfare: an analysis of the phenomenon

Oleksandr Tiaglo — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

Abstract. Information warfare is based on different material phenomena and aims to influence the material world in a certain way. However, it also includes an equally necessary and important – ideal – constituent, which is rooted in psyche of individuals, human communities and is usually reflected outward, perceived, introduced into life and organized through relevant use of language, through visualization, etc. My research is devoted to the logical and philosophical analysis of this particular constituent of information warfare.

Social networks and electronic media, more widely – the Internet is almost the most important field for conducting the ideal component of information warfare today. Professional trolls and bots organized into "troll factories" and "bot farms" pose a great informational danger in the Internet. Their main product is the mass delivering of made-to-order (dis)information. For this, a set of fictitious "creatures" is produced – an "army of informational puppet-soldiers" with certain names and profiles in social networks.

Traditionally, publishing under a pseudonym is an acceptable or even legal way to protect the life and other rights of an author. The situation acquires new dangerous character when human activity moves into cyberspace massively, especially under condition of information warfare. Here, the use of pseudonyms provides not only anonymity, but also mass production of the "information puppet-soldiers" by trolls and bots.

In this research, some elementary ways to identify trolls were found. Together with fact checking, they are useful to protect against malicious informational influences, but are not always sufficient. This is so in the cases where, in particular, a deliverer of disinformation, trying to avoid clear deception, employs different logical tricks. Here one cannot do without of at least the basics knowledge of logic and some skill in critical thinking. This requires strengthening and renovating the mass teaching of these disciplines in schools and universities.

It is emphasized that an effective national system of conducting the ideal component of information warfare should combine groups of special officers of the competent state structures, specialized media workers, as well as relevant public organizations and individual information volunteers. But ideally, everyone should be educated to give himself or herself at least first aid against disinformation.

Key words: information warfare, ideal constituent of information warfare, Internet, troll, troll identification, "information puppet-soldiers", logic, critical thinking.

The Socrates problem: classical solution strategies and their analytical interpretations in the studies of K. Popper and G. Vlastos.

Andrii Abdula — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

The Socrates problem is one of the oldest philosophical problems. Socrates is called “the founder of the Western philosophy” and “the first real philosopher”, but perhaps the Socrates we know was just a literary character in Plato's dialogues. Even his contemporaries could not unequivocally answer the question "Who was a real Socrates?". Three ancient authors closest to him, whose works have survived (Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato), gave him contradictory characteristics, and later authors arbitrarily used his image.

At the same time, researchers did not abandon attempts to recreate the "historical Socrates". By the end of the 19th century, there had been formed several strategies for solving the Socratic problem as a historical-philosophical and methodological problem. Based on these strategies, modern interpretations arose both in analytic philosophy and outside of it.

The article examines the main approaches to solving the Socratic problem, taking into account the methodological guidelines that have been developed recently: distinguishing literary-contextual (hermeneutic) and analytic directions of research, unitary and evolutionary approaches, historically oriented analysis, etc.

It also focuses the attention on two approaches representing the analytic direction of research and considered within the framework of the evolutionist paradigm for solving the problem of Socrates. These approaches are united by a general methodological guideline and a general tendency to contrast the portraits of Socrates and Plato. However, these approaches differ significantly in terms of philosophical weight and influence.

The first of these approaches is presented in the works of the famous British philosopher Karl Popper, in particular, in his pivotal work The Open Society and its Enemies. In this work, Popper paid considerable attention to the figure of Socrates comparing him with Plato. For Popper, Socrates is a representative of an open, free society, while Plato is a "prophet" of a closed society. For K. Popper, solving the problem of Socrates is a philosophical justification for such an opposition; therefore, the paper draws considerable attention to this problem.

The second approach represents the methodology developed by the preeminent American historian of philosophy G. Vlastos, which is characterized as "analytic developmentalism". In general, it is also aimed at finding arguments in favor of opposing the philosophy of Socrates and the philosophy of Plato. At the same time, Vlastos's research is mainly focused on questions of historical and philosophical content. His concept is considered one of the fundamental ones in this direction of research.

Mind-body interaction, physical causation, and the natures of substances in Descartes’s philosophy

Dmytro Sepetyi — Sat, 17 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0200

The article discusses the problem of the compatibility of Descartes’s doctrine of interactionist substance dualism with his claims about the law of the conservation of the quantity of motion, about the way God maintains the world in existence, and about minds and bodies having only properties that are modes of thinking or extension respectively. The case is made that although there seem to be prima facie conflicts, they can be neutralised as merely apparent. The position that mental states cause some motions in the brain is consistent with Descartes’s postulation of the existence of the law of conservation of the quantity of motion, insofar as it derives from God’s immutability whereas souls are not immutable, as well as with the laws of conservation established by Newtonian physics, insofar as they don’t prohibit purely redistributive changes and are established only for physical interactions. Descartes’s interactionism does not conflict with his statements about the way God maintains the world in existence, if the latter are construed in the sense that God preserves motion in the world by preserving the laws of nature, and the conservation of the world by God is a continuation of the initial act of creation. The principle that all properties of a substance are modes of its main attribute agrees with substance dualism and interactionism, if we admit that Descartes’s ontology of the world includes, besides substances of two kinds with their main attributes and modes of those attributes, something more ‒ irreducible sue generis entities, such as the substantial union of body and soul and/or psychophysical laws of nature.