Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i20.2598

Keywords:

anti-zombie, coherence, conceivability, phenomenal zombie, physicalism

Abstract

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

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References

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Published

2019-11-30

How to Cite

Sepetyi, D. (2019). Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not. Actual Problems of Mind, (20), 18–28. https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i20.2598

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