Two approaches to modification of object-property relation in meinongianism

Authors

  • Anastasiya Kovalenko Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v18i1.20

Keywords:

meinongianism, principle of unrestricted free assumption, intentional objects, property, predicate

Abstract

The paper considers two approaches to a modification of an object–property relation in meinongianism. These approaches are developed to solve some paradoxes emerged due to including intentional objects into the range of interpretation of the propositional attitudes. The author demonstrates the limits of these approaches in resolving the paradoxes, and compares them to each other.

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Author Biography

Anastasiya Kovalenko, Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine

аспiрантка вiддiлу логiки та методологiї науки Iнституту фiлософiї iм. Г.С. Сковороди НАНУ, м. Київ.

References

Berto F. Existence as a Real Property: The Ontology of Meinongianism. — Dordrecht : Springer, 2012.
Crane T. The Objects of Thought. — Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.
Fine K. Critical review of Parsons’ non-existent objects // Philosophical Studies. — 1984. — No 45. — P. 95-142.
Jacquette D. Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence. — New York : de Gruyter, 1996.
Linsky B. Ernst Mally’s Anticipation of Encoding // Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. — 2014. — No 5. — Vol. 2. — P. 1-14.
Zalta E. Intensional Logic and The Metaphysics of Intentionality. — Massachusetts : The MIT Press, 1988.

Published

2017-11-09

How to Cite

Kovalenko, A. (2017). Two approaches to modification of object-property relation in meinongianism. Actual Problems of Mind, (18), 109–119. https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v18i1.20

Issue

Section

TOPICAL ISSUES IN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY