Academic integrity as a philosophical and anthropological problem}

Abstract

This article analyzes the problem of academic integrity from a philosophical and anthropological perspective. By employing the logic of wholeness and an anti-essentialist approach, integrity is presented as a desirable systemic property whose acquisition requires significant volitional effort. The article establishes a conceptual affinity between academic integrity and Kant’s understanding of character as a way of thinking (Denkungsart) that determines a person’s mode of action. On this basis, the paper proposes clarifying and expanding the concept of integrity by drawing on Kant’s account of ways of thinking and their cultivation, as well as on the notions of intellectual character and epistemic virtues. Intellectual character is interpreted with reference to Ritchhart’s dispositional approach to intelligence and the tradition of virtue epistemology. The article proposes a classification of epistemic virtues into three groups corresponding to Kant’s maxims of unprejudiced, broad-minded, and consistent ways of thinking. Particular attention is devoted to moral integrity and its place within the structure of character in connection with Kant’s concept of a “revolution in one’s disposition” (Gesinnung). Ultimately, academic integrity is presented in two modes: as an internally grounded intellectual and moral integrity of the epistemic agent rooted in character, and as its institutional embodiment in inquiry-based academic practices within scientific, educational, and organizational contexts. Emphasizing actions carried out with academic integrity shifts the focus from declared norms to established dispositions of thinking and behavior that manifest in the processes of creating, disseminating, and organizing knowledge. This approach offers a new perspective on the conditions of possibility for academic integrity, under which integrity-based actions become intrinsically motivated.