Relativism, the "Myth of the frameworks", and rationality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31812/apm27.qsybb411Keywords:
critical rationalism; relativism; Popper; frameworks; fallibilism; criticism; pluralism; rationality.Abstract
The article examines relativism as one of the key forms of contemporary irrationalism and analyzes how critical rationalism maintains theoretical and methodological resilience against relativist objections. Drawing on Popper’s critique of the “myth of the framework,” it is shown that openness to criticism does not entail embracing relativism but, on the contrary, presupposes shared moral and intellectual foundations that make rational discourse possible.
The study considers several conceptual versions of critical rationalism – from W. Bartley’s pancritical rationalism to J. Agassi’s pluralist interpretation and H. Albert’s methodological rationalism – highlighting how these approaches reinterpret the status of criticism, fallibilism, and the limits of rationality. The article also examines N. Rescher’s account as an attempt to formulate a model of rationality that preserves pluralism without collapsing into egalitarian relativism. Contemporary interpretations that identify affinities between Popper’s methodology and relativist strategies are likewise taken into consideration.
A central result of the analysis is the reconstruction of the multi-level structure of the principles of critical rationalism. It is shown that the principles of criticism, fallibilism, and pluralism operate at different theoretical levels and require distinguishing between internal and external criticism, as well as acknowledging the moral presuppositions underlying rational discussion. This configuration allows critical rationalism to combine openness to alternatives with conceptual coherence, thereby avoiding both dogmatism and relativism.
The article concludes that the anti-relativist potential of critical rationalism lies not in a claim to possess immutable truth, but in the normative structure of the commitment to rationality as a practice of critical inquiry. This enables the critical tradition to preserve its capacity for self-reflection while upholding the boundaries of rational discourse.
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