Two approaches to modification of object-property relation in meinongianism

Authors

  • Anastasiya Kovalenko , Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine , , Iнститут фiлософiї iм. Г.С. Сковороди НАНУ

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v18i1.20

Keywords:

meinongianism, principle of unrestricted free assumption, intentional objects, property, predicate

Abstract

The paper considers two approaches to a modification of an object–property relation in meinongianism. These approaches are developed to solve some paradoxes emerged due to including intentional objects into the range of interpretation of the propositional attitudes. The author demonstrates the limits of these approaches in resolving the paradoxes, and compares them to each other.

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Author Biography

  • Anastasiya Kovalenko, , Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine, , Iнститут фiлософiї iм. Г.С. Сковороди НАНУ

    аспiрантка вiддiлу логiки та методологiї науки Iнституту фiлософiї iм. Г.С. Сковороди НАНУ, м. Київ.

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Published

09.11.2017

Issue

No. 18 (2017)

Section

TOPICAL ISSUES IN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

License

Copyright (c) 2017 Anastasiya Kovalenko

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Two approaches to modification of object-property relation in meinongianism. (2017). Actual Problems of Mind, 18, 109-119. https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v18i1.20