Was Descartes a substance dualist?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i19.2069Keywords:
mind, body, dualism, trialism, substance, attributeAbstract
The paper deals with the problem of interpretation of Descartes’philosophy of mind in view of existent divergences in the understanding ofsubstance dualism and of the objections and doubts concerning the correctnessof the dualistic interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy that were broached inthe recent publications by L. Bodnarchuk, A. Sen (2014) and O. Khoma (2016) with reference to the alternative interpretations by John Cottingham and Jean-Luke Marion. An explanation is provided about the basic points of Cartesi-an substance dualism as the doctrine about two fundamental kinds of thi-ngs (substances) that have radically different natures but actually (in humanbeings) are closely causally related. Cottingham’s trialistic interpretation of Descartes’ doctrine is shown to be deficient in several respects; as for Mari-on’s interpretation, it is argued that the reasons provided by the Ukrainianauthors for considering it as a good alternative to the dualistic interpretationare debatable and gravely insufficient.
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