The Demarcation Problem: Karl Popper’s Solution in the Contemporary Retrospective

Abstract

The article analyses post-Popperian debates about the problem of demarcation. The case is made that Karl Popper’s proposition to demarcate empirical science from the rest («metaphysics») on the basis of falsifiability as the criterion of empirical character of theories remains a tenable way of seeing the most valuable aspect of the character of the scientific enterprise. It is explained that for the falsifiability criterion to be adequate for the purpose, we should consider it, as Popper did, as two-aspect — involving the logical content of theories and the critical attitude of researchers. Although falsifiability, in this sense, is not sufficient to neatly demarcate science from non-science, it can be considered as the most important necessary condition, which can be supplemented by some further requirements, for an empirical hypothesis to count as part of the body of science. In particular, it is argued that Lee McIntyre’s proposition to see empirical science as a matter of what he calls «scientific attitude» perfectly fits with this falsifiability-based perspective. William Bartley’s and Harry Laudan’s deflationary approaches to the demarcation problem are criticised as failing to recognise the practical significance of distinguishing what is and what is not empirical science, and the necessity of some theoretical grounding (however imperfect) for practicing this distinction. The suggestions of Joseph Agassi, Imre Lakatos, and Thomas Kuhn purported at the improval of Popper’s demarcational proposition are discussed, and the author’s own proposition is advanced and explained. It is also pointed out that Popper’s remark that the distinctive feature of scientific theories is openness to criticism and modification in its light serves as the basis for a wider conception of science, without the qualification «empirical».