Against Wittgenstein's poker and the positivist axe: how Karl Popper rehabilitates philosophical problems

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55056/apm.7759

Keywords:

Karl Popper, philosophical problem, logic, What Can Logic Do for Philosophy?, logical analysis, logical empiricism, critical rationalism

Abstract

The article addresses one of the fundamental questions in twentieth-century philosophy – the status of philosophical problems. At the centre of attention is Karl Popper’s position, formulated in response to the programme of logical positivism and the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The article analyses Popper’s key arguments in defence of the reality of philosophical problems and the possibility of their rational resolution, as well as the intellectual and historical context in which the debate unfolded – in  particular, his confrontation with Wittgenstein, known as the «poker incident».

In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the content of the 1948 symposium What Can Logic Do for Philosophy?, especially on Popper’s contribution, published here for the first time in Ukrainian translation. In this text, Popper continues his polemic regarding the status of philosophical problems and argues that logic is not confined to linguistic analysis or the formal scaffolding of science. Rather, he presents logic as a tool of rational criticism that can be applied to meaningful philosophical questions – questions that are open to discussion and capable of at least provisional resolution.

Special attention is paid to the responses of the other participants in the symposium – William Kneale and Alfred J. Ayer – who offer moderate opposition to Popper’s views. Kneale argues that philosophers should not waste time debating the boundaries of their discipline and methods but acknowledge that in logic they possess at least one legitimate domain of inquiry, where sustained work may yield significant results. In his view, logic can indeed serve as an effective method for addressing philosophical problems, provided that philosophers stay abreast of developments in modern logic. Ayer, for his part, seeks to clarify what makes a problem philosophical, and how philosophical method differs from that of the natural sciences. He closely examines the examples of philosophical problems cited by Popper, agreeing that they are genuinely philosophical, but criticising Popper’s strategy for analysing them. Instead, Ayer demonstrates the potential of contemporary logical analysis.

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Author Biography

  • Nadiia Kozachenko, Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University

    Department of Philosophy

References

Ayer A.J. Language, truth and logic. London, 1936.

Edmonds D., Eidinow J. Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers. London: Faber & Faber, 2001.

Grattan-Guinness I. Russell and Karl Popper: Their Personal Contacts. Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies. 1992. Vol. 12 (1). P. 3-19.

Kneale W.C., Kneale M. The Development of Logic. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1962.

Popper K.R. The nature of philosophical problems and their roots in science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 3 (10). P. 124-156.

Popper K.R. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. New York : Routledge, 1976.

Popper K.R., Kneale W.C., Ayer A.J. What can Logic do for Philosophy? Aristotelian Society. 1948. Suppl. Vol. 22 (1). P. 141-178. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/22.1.141

Published

01.09.2025

How to Cite

Against Wittgenstein’s poker and the positivist axe: how Karl Popper rehabilitates philosophical problems. (2025). Actual Problems of Mind, 26, 324-338. https://doi.org/10.55056/apm.7759

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